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significantly contributes to livestock production and the
livestock operation.
The issues involved
Basically, the states are struggling with three issues —
(1) where hogs in this country are going to be produced,
which has enormous economic implications, (2) whether
large confinement operations constitute unfair competition
for family-size producers and (3) the extent to which the
"externalities" of air and water pollution are to be contained
to the tracts of land involved in the confinement operations.
Most concede the first point and agree that states adopting
highly restrictive policies governing confinement facilities
could reduce their chance of being a major player in hog
production in the future.
The competition issue, many believe, can only be
addressed meaningfully at the national level. Short of a firm
national policy favoring family-size operations, support for
state-level limitations is likely to erode as some states
aggressively pursue investment in hog facilities.
As for water pollution, that is mostly a question of
investment needed to contain runoff and seepage. Tough
environmental rules are likely to require that the necessary
investment be made, at least for operations above some
minimum size.
The odor problems are currently the most difficult to
handle. Ultimately, science is expected to reduce and
possibly eliminate the problem. At the moment, states are
left with a regulatory approach in terms of "buffering" of
operations and limits on waste disposal practices.
In conclusion
The four states that have recently legislated on the
matter are likely to be joined by other jurisdictions
attempting to grapple with the issues involved.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ABANDONMENT. The debtor had filed a pre-petition
suit against the seller of dairy cattle to the debtor which
were infected with brucellosis. The case was pending at the
time the debtor filed for Chapter 7 but the debtor did not
include the case in the schedule of assets. The debtor did
eventually include the case in the statement of financial
affairs. The trustee filed a no-asset report and the Chapter 7
case was closed. Four years later, the debtor received a $2.4
million award in the case against the cattle seller and the
trustee moved to reopen the case to include the award in
bankruptcy estate property. The debtor argued that the
award was abandoned by the trustee under Section 554(c)
by virtue of the trustee’s filing of the no-asset report. The
court held that the award was not abandoned under Section
554(c) because the pending suit was not included in the
debtor’s schedule of assets. In re Winburn, 167 B.R. 673
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors had filed a previous
Chapter 11 case. A creditor had sought relief from the
automatic stay but the request was denied. The debtors
voluntarily dismissed the case in March 1993. The debtor
refiled for Chapter 11 in May 1993 and the creditors sought
dismissal of the case, arguing that the debtors were
ineligible, under Section 109(g) to file another case sooner
than 180 days after the dismissal of the previous case. The
court held that the statute was clear that where a case is
dismissed after a request for relief from the automatic stay,
the debtor, if an individual or family farmer, may not file
another case for 180 days. The court held that the outcome
of the request for relief from the stay or the debtors’ motives
in filing the second case were irrelevant to the application of
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Section 109(g). Kuo v. Walton, 167 B.R. 677 (M.D. Fla.
1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AUTOMOBILE. The debtors, husband and wife, filed a
joint bankruptcy case and both claimed an exemption of
$2,400 in an automobile owned solely by the wife. The
court held that although both debtors could claim an
automobile exemption, only the wife could claim an
exemption in an automobile owned solely by the wife. In re
Miller, 167 B.R. 782 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1994).
DOMICILE. The debtor had been a veterinarian living
full time in Kansas until 1986 when the debtor sold the
residence and started renting apartments. The debtor and
spouse spent their winters in Arizona and eventually
purchased a lot and built a house there. At the time the
petition was filed, the debtor still rented an apartment in
Kansas, titled the debtor’s vehicles in Kansas, retained a
Kansas driver’s license, voted in Kansas and filed federal
income tax returns with a Kansas address. The debtor also
testified that the debtor and wife always intended to return
to Kansas. The court held that the debtor’s domicile was in
Kansas and the debtor could claim Kansas exemptions. In
re Hodgson, 167 B.R. 945 (D. Kan. 1994).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor claimed as exempt the
cash surrender value of a life insurance policy on the life of
the debtor with the debtor’s adult children as beneficiaries.
The trustee objected to the exemption, claiming that the
exemption was not allowable because the beneficiaries were
not dependents of the debtor. The court held that the
exemption statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(a)(6)(B), did
not require that the beneficiaries be dependents of the
debtor. In re Thatcher, 167 B.R. 466 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. During the debtor’s Chapter
12 five year plan, the debtor’s father died and the debtor
was named as a beneficiary of the estate. The estate was
admitted to probate but the debtor’s share was not
distributed during the plan period. The debtor’s plan
provided for payments to unsecured creditors equal to the
maximum of $25,000 or all disposable income up to the
amount of the claims. At the end of the plan period,
unsecured creditors had received only the $25,000. The
debtor did not include the inheritance in the final report and
the unsecured creditors sought to convert the case to
Chapter 7 for fraud in the filing of the final report and for
not including the inheritance in disposable income. The
court held that the motion to convert the case for fraud was
denied as untimely filed. The court also held that, because
the right to an inheritance becomes property of the estate,
the inheritance was disposable income whether or not paid
to the debtor during the plan period. Agribank, FCB v.
Honey, 167 B.R. 540 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors had filed for Chapter 11
and the plan contained an agreement for payment of a
secured debt over 7 years with a balloon payment at the end
of the plan. The agreement provided for a renegotiated
extension of another seven years at the end of the plan. The
debtors made the plan payments but after selling half of the
debtors’ dairy herd, sought a reduction in the interest rate
and a renegotiation of the terms of the balloon payment. The
parties failed to agree and the debtors filed for Chapter 12.
The creditor argued that the second filing was a bad faith
filing merely to force a better deal in the negotiation of the
payments. The court held that the second filing was not
made in bad faith but was made only when the changed
circumstances of the debtors’ operation and the failed
negotiations forced the debtors to file for Chapter 12 or face
foreclosure. In re Roth, 167 B.R. 911 (Bankr. D. S.D.
1994).
PLAN. The debtors had been farming leased land for
several years prior to filing bankruptcy and had experienced
declining per acre income. The debtors’ plan included
payment of a secured claim over the plan period at 9.8
percent interest, the original contract rate of the secured
loan, and had projected substantially increased income per
acre for funding the plan. The court held that the deferred
payments on the oversecured claim would be charged 12
percent, the market rate of interest for similar loans. The
court also held that the plan was not confirmable because
the plan projected per acre income substantially higher than
the debtors’ historical per acre income without any changes
in the operation or crop produced to account for the
increased income. In re Foertsch, 167 B.R. 555 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1994).
The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of
the Farm Credit Bank’s (FCB) secured loan over 30 years at
8 percent interest. The FCB objected to the plan as not
paying it the current value of the claim because the interest
rate was less than the market rate for similar loans. The FCB
argued that the interest rate should be 11.1 percent, equal to
the interest rate for new loans, 9.85 percent, plus 1.2 percent
for the increased risk of lending to the debtor with a history
of defaults and a financially troubled farming operation. The
court held that the debtors did not pose any additional risk
because the bankruptcy case would provide a
comprehensive reorganization of the debtors’ finances;
therefore, the appropriate interest rate would be the market
rate for similar new loans, 9.85 percent, with no additional
interest for risk. The court also denied confirmation of the
debtors’ plan because the projected income and expenses
were substantially different than the debtors’ historical
income and expenses and the debtors failed to explain the
differences. The court dismissed the case because the
debtors had failed to propose a confirmable plan, had failed
to file proper schedules on time and had failed to timely
prosecute the case throughout the proceedings. In re Zerr,
167 B.R. 953 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for a trustee’s fee of 10 percent of the payments to
be made to the creditors. The trustee objected to the plan,
arguing that the fee was to be applied to the payments made
to the trustee, resulting in a 11.11 percent charge against the
payments to be made to the creditors. The court held that the
statutory fee of 10 percent was unambiguous and was
limited to 10 percent of the property to be paid to the
creditors. The court reasoned that because the statute
assessed the fee against “the payments made under the plan”
and because only the trustee makes the plan payments, the
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fee could not be assessed to payments made to the trustee by
the debtor. In re Wallace, 167 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. In February 1993, the
IRS filed tax liens against the debtors’ property for 1988
and 1991 taxes. In February and March 1993, the debtors
made two partial payments of the taxes owed. On April 13,
1993, the IRS levied against the bank account of the
debtors. The debtors filed for Chapter 11 on April 23, 1993
and sought avoidance of the tax liens, the tax payments and
tax levy as preferential transfers. The court held that the tax
liens, payments and levy were not avoidable under Sections
545 and 547(c)(6). In re Fandre, 167 B.R. 837 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1994).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a claim for pre-petition priority
taxes three months after the bar date for filing claims. The
trustee moved to disallow the claim as untimely filed. The
court held that Section 502 does not provide for
disallowance of untimely filed claims and Section 726(a)(3)
provides for payment of unsecured allowed claims which
were tardily filed; therefore, the IRS claim would be
allowed. In re Brennan, 167 B.R. 316 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had filed timely income tax
returns for 1987 but failed to make estimated tax payments
or timely payment of the tax due. Most of the tax liability
was incurred from sales of property late in 1987. Prior to the
sales, the debtor had loaned money sufficient to pay the
taxes to the spouse to start a business and to buy a van. The
IRS argued that the taxes were nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(1)(C) because of tax evasion by the debtor.
The court held that the IRS had to show an affirmative act to
evade payment of tax before the taxes would be
nondischargeable. The court held that the IRS failed to show
any affirmative act by the debtor to evade taxes since the
debtor had filed a timely and accurate return and had lent
the money before incurring the taxes. Matter of Howard,
167 B.R. 684 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
RETURNS. The debtors, husband and wife, filed a joint
Chapter 7 petition under Section 302. The trustee filed a
federal income tax return, Form 1041, for the bankruptcy
estate and claimed two personal exemptions and two
standard deductions as if the return was filed by married
persons filing separately, using two Forms 1040. The IRS
argued that because the debtors had filed a joint petition,
only one bankruptcy estate was created which was entitled
to only one personal exemption and one standard deduction.
The court held that, because Section 302(b) provides for
consolidation of jointly filed cases, the jointly filed cases
remain separate entities and separate bankruptcy estates
until jointly filed cases are consolidated by an order of the
court. Therefore, each debtor’s bankruptcy estate in the
jointly filed case was entitled to its own personal exemption
and standard deduction. In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COTTON. The CCC has issued interim regulations
amending the upland and long staple cotton loan and loan
deficiency programs to, among other things, reduce or
waive the liquidated damages involved in loan contract
defaults. 59 Fed. Reg. 39251 (Aug. 2, 1994).
FEED GRAINS. The CCC has issued proposed
regulations establishing the 1994 feed grain Acreage
Reduction Program percentages as 0 percent for wheat,
grain sorghum, corn, barley and oats. The final rules also
provide that no paid land diversion program will be
implemented.
The price support levels for 1994 feed grains are:
Wheat $2.58/bu.
Corn 1.89/bu.
Grain sorghum 1.80/bu.
Barley 1.54/bu.
Oats .97/bu.
Rye 1.61/bu.
Soybeans 4.92/bu.
Oil seeds .087/lb.
 59 Fed. Reg. 39247 (Aug. 2, 1994).
The CCC has issued proposed regulations establishing
the 1995 acreage reduction percentage for corn, grain
sorghum and barley at no more than 12.5 percent and for
oats at 0 percent.  59 Fed. Reg. 39707 (Aug. 4, 1994).
PESTICIDES. The EPA has notified the Department of
Agriculture of intent to issue regulations governing the
distinction between plants and plant-pesticides under
FIFRA. The proposed regulations will exempt low-risk
plant-pesticides from regulation under FIFRA. 59 Fed. Reg.
35662 (July 13, 1994).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations changing the designation of Louisiana from a
modified accredited state to an accredited-free state. 59 Fed.
Reg. 36691 (July 19, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The surviving spouse
of the decedent petitioned the state probate court for
protective orders for disclaimers by the decedent’s minor
children of their interests in the decedent’s estate. The
probate court granted the orders and the disclaimers were
filed, resulting in passage of the property to the surviving
spouse. The IRS argued that the disclaimers were invalid
under state law because the disclaimers were not in the best
interests of the children and would be reversed by the state
appellate court. The Tax Court held that the disclaimers
were in the best interests of the children because the
disclaimers would result in larger inheritances and would
keep the family corporation within the family. Est. of Goree
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-331.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent had held a lifetime interest in a trust
established in 1974 by the decedent’s predeceased spouse’s
will. The trust provided that if the surviving spouse did not
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exercise a testamentary general power of appointment over
the trust assets, the assets passed to the grantor’s
grandchildren. The decedent died in 1987 without
exercising the power of appointment. The interest in the
trust was included in the decedent’s gross estate and was
assessed for GSTT because the decedent was treated as the
transferor of the assets to the grandchildren, the failure to
exercise the power of appointment was treated as a
constructive addition to the trust, and the trust was not
irrevocable on and after September 25, 1986, because the
testamentary power of appointment could alter the trust
remainder interests. E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v.
Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 38 (1994).
An inter vivos trust created by the decedent became
irrevocable upon the decedent’s death with the decedent’s
two children as beneficiaries. The beneficiaries proposed to
split the trust into two equal parts with provisions identical
to the original trust.  However, the trust assets were not
distributed pro rata and the trust did not contain any
provision to allow non-pro rata divisions. The IRS ruled that
the division of the trust would not subject the trust to GSTT
but that the non-pro rata distribution resulted in a taxable
disposition of the trust assets under I.R.C. § 1001. Ltr. Rul.
9429012, April 22, 1994.
The decedent’s will created two trusts in 1960 for the
benefit of the decedent’s children and grandchildren. The
trust terminated no later than 21 years after the death of the
last beneficiary living on the decedent’s death. The trusts
provided for distributions to the remainder holders when the
remainder holders became 21 years old. The trustee
proposed to exercise the trustee’s authority to extend the
distribution date to the last date before complete termination
of the trust. The IRS ruled that the exercise of the trustee’s
authority would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9429014, April 22, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The decedent had received various
types of real and personal property from a predeceased
spouse and had placed the property in a trust which became
irrevocable on the decedent’s death and passed to the
decedent’s daughter for life with a remainder to the
daughter’s children. The decedent later learned that the
property in the trust was held in several complex forms and
would take a substantial amount of time to liquidate or
convert. The decedent then amended the trust to add a
successor trustee/life beneficiary in order to give the trustee
more time to convert the property before it passed to the
decedent’s grandchildren. The successor trustee finished
converting the property and petitioned the state probate
court to terminate the trust early so that the property would
pass to the grandchildren as originally intended. The IRS
ruled that a state court would rule that the early termination
of the trust would be allowable if the current beneficiary
assented to the termination. Because the assent of the
beneficiary was required for termination, the early
termination would result in a taxable gift to the remainder
holders of the value of the current beneficiary’s interest in
the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9428032, April 20, 1994.
LIFE INSURANCE. The taxpayer was chairman and
CEO of a corporation which purchased a life insurance
policy on the life of the taxpayer with the taxpayer’s
descendants as beneficiaries of the policy. The taxpayer had
no authority over the corporation’s ownership rights in the
policy. The IRS ruled that the life insurance policy would
not be included in the taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul.
9428010, April 14, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9428011, April 14,
1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent was a beneficiary of a trust established by the will
of the decedent's predeceased spouse. The executor of the
predeceased spouse’s estate had made a QTIP election for
the decedent’s interest in the trust. The trust made no
provision for distribution of accumulated income on the
decedent’s death but the IRS issued a closing letter allowing
the QTIP election and a marital deduction for the
predeceased spouse’s estate. The decedent’s estate did not
include the trust interest in the decedent’s gross estate,
arguing that the interest did not qualify as QTIP because the
trust did not provide that any accumulated trust income be
distributed to the decedent’s estate. The Tax Court held that
under its prior decision of Est. of Howard, 91 T.C. 329
(1990), rev’d, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,033 (9th Cir.
1990), the trust interest did not qualify as QTIP; therefore,
the predeceased spouse’s estate was not entitled to a marital
deduction and the trust interest was not included in the
decedent’s gross estate. The court also held that the
proposed regulations allowing such trust interests to be
QTIP were not sufficient authority and were not applicable
because proposed after the death of the predeceased spouse.
Est. of Shelfer v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 2 (1994).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . In 1931, the
decedent’s predeceased spouse created a revocable trust
which provided that upon the death of the predeceased
spouse, one-half of trust income was to be paid to the
decedent and one-third to the predeceased spouse’s children.
If no children or descendants survived the decedent, the
decedent had the testamentary power to distribute trust
corpus. In 1954, the predeceased spouse amended the trust
to provide for one-half of the trust income to be distributed
to the decedent and granted the decedent a testamentary
power of appointment over one-half of the trust, without any
other condition. The IRS ruled that the decedent’s power of
appointment did not qualify as a pre-1942 power because
the amount of property subject to the property increased and
the conditions for exercising the power were changed in
1954. Ltr. Rul. 9428001, March 23, 1994.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent had owned a 26.67 percent interest in a ranch, with
the decedent’s child owning the other interests. The ranch
was composed of pasture which was cash rented to third
parties for grazing cattle or for hunting. The decedent
provided some feeding of the wild animals in drought years
and some watering places for the livestock and wild animals
but otherwise provided no services for the renters. The
decedent and child did not live on the farm and employed a
foreman and two employees to maintain the windmills and
water systems. The estate agreed that the decedent did not
materially participate in the operation of the ranch during
the eight years before death. The decedent had reported
several years of losses on the federal tax returns and
reported the losses as from passive investments. The IRS
ruled that the ranch was not eligible for special use
valuation because the ranch was not used by the decedent in
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a qualified use during any of the eight years before death
because no crop or livestock were produced on the land and
the decedent was not at risk as to the income from the rent
for the land. The IRS also ruled that neither the decedent nor
the child materially participating in the ranch operation
during any of the eight years before the decedent’s death.
Ltr. Rul. 9428002, March 29, 1994.
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY FOR ESTATE TAX.
The taxpayer was a beneficiary of $50,000 from the
decedent’s estate. The estate was assessed estate taxes
which were not paid and the IRS assessed the taxes and
interest to the taxpayer. The IRS argued that once the
taxpayer was assessed for the estate taxes, the taxes became
a personal obligation subject to interest until paid. The court
held that I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2) limits a transferee’s estate tax
liability to the value at the decedent’s death of the property
received from the decedent; therefore, the taxpayer was not
liable for taxes and interest in excess of the $50,000
received. Baptiste v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,173 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’g on point , 100 T.C. 252
(1993).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayer sold an interest in a partnership by installment
contract. The taxpayer’s federal return preparer erroneously
elected out of installment reporting of the gain from the sale.
The mistake was not discovered until one year later by the
taxpayer’s new return preparer who immediately sought to
revoke the election out. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer had
established good cause for an extension of time to revoke
the election out of installment reporting. Ltr. Rul. 9428031,
April 20, 1994.
PAYMENT OF WAGES IN COMMODITIES-ALM
§ 4.06[2].* The taxpayer was a C corporation which
operated a grain farming business. The corporation had two
shareholders, husband and wife, and the husband was
employed by the corporation to manage the farm operation.
The husband’s wages were paid as a varying percentage of
the crop produced, but the eventual cash received for the
grain was relatively constant over several years. The
husband retained the grain in bins owned by the husband
from 5 to 60 days before sale. The corporation conceded
that the grain was transferred with the intent to have the
grain converted to cash and that the form of the wages was
chosen to reduce the husband’s tax liability. The corporation
argued that the wages were paid in grain for the business
purpose of an incentive to the husband to provide quality
labor. The IRS ruled that the in-kind wages were subject to
FICA tax  because (1) no valid business purpose was
established for the form of payment; (2) the short holding
period indicated that the form of payment could be ignored;
(3) the shareholders’ control over the corporation gave them
control over the form of compensation, and (4) the cash
proceeds were constant. Ltr. Rul. 9428003, April 5, 1994.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. Prior to the debtor’s
appointment as president and secretary of a corporation, the
corporation had underpaid federal employment taxes. After
the debtor became an officer of the corporation, the
corporation did not have substantial assets in excess of the
daily operating capital needs of the corporation, although
the corporation agreed to pay the IRS $1,000 per month.
The IRS assessed the debtor the 100 percent penalty of
I.R.C. § 6672 as a responsible person of the corporation.
The IRS argued that the corporation had sufficient deposits
to pay the tax while the debtor was an officer. The court
held that, although the deposits were substantial, the
operational needs of the corporation used most of the funds;
therefore, the debtor did not willfully fail to pay the
employment taxes since the debtor was not a responsible
person when the taxes were incurred and the corporation did
not have sufficient funds to pay the taxes, above operational
needs, after the debtor became an officer. In re Rossiter,
167 B.R. 919 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.80 5.72 5.68 5.65
110% AFR 6.39 6.29 6.24 6.21
120% AFR 6.98 6.86 6.80 6.76
Mid-term
AFR 7.05 6.93 6.87 6.83
110% AFR 7.77 7.62 7.55 7.50
120% AFR 8.49 8.32 8.24 8.18
Long-term
AFR 7.67 7.53 7.46 7.41
110% AFR 8.45 8.28 8.20 8.14
120% AFR 9.24 9.04 8.94 8.87
TAX SHELTER. The taxpayer was a physician who
invested in a sheep breeding operation where the taxpayer
purported to sell sheep to the promoter of the operation. The
court found that the taxpayer knew nothing about raising
sheep and that the transactions involved were shams since
the promoter completely controlled the operation and bore
all the risk of loss. The taxpayer’s payment of substantial
maintenance and interest expenses was ignored because the
tax benefits were far greater than the taxpayer’s costs. The
court held that the deductions and credits claimed from the
investment were not allowable and that the taxpayer was
subject to the negligence penalty for ignoring the advice of
the taxpayer’s accountant, for unreasonable reliance on the
tax advice of the investment promoter, and for not showing
any substantial authority for the deductions claimed.
Anagnoston v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-334.
TRUSTS. A two-year charitable remainder trust was
established with the present beneficiary, the donor,
receiving 80 percent of the current value of the trust assets
in each year with the remainder to be paid to a charitable
organization. The trust was funded with $1 million in
property with no basis. No distribution was made during the
first year and at the beginning of the second year, the trust
assets were sold for $1 million and the first year distribution
of $800,000 was made to the beneficiary before April 15.
The trust also made the second year distribution of
$160,000, 80 percent of the assets remaining after the first
year distribution. The trust argued that the first year
distribution of $800,000 should be characterized as an
I.R.C. § 664(b)(4) distribution of trust corpus and not taxed
and that the second year distribution should be characterized
as capital gain to the beneficiary. The result was that only
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               127
$160,000 (the second year 80 percent distribution) was
taxed. The IRS has announced that it will challenge these
transactions under several legal doctrines, including
assignment of income, invalid charitable remainder trust and
treatment of substance over form. Notice 94-78, I.R.B.
1994-32.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations governing the
Form 1041 reporting requirements of grantor trusts. If the
trust is treated as owned by one grantor or other person,
instead of filing a Form 1041, the trustee may choose
between two methods of reporting: the trustee must furnish
to all payors of income and proceeds either (1) the name and
taxpayer identification number (TIN) of the grantor or other
person and the address of the trust, or (2) the name, TIN and
address of the trust. If the trust is treated as owned by more
than one grantor or other person and the trustee furnishes
the name, TIN and address of the trust to all payors, the
trustee need only file appropriate Forms 1099. Except where
the trustee is also the only grantor or other owner, the
trustee is required to furnish each grantor or other owner
with (1) a statement of all trust income, deductions and
credits; (2) information which is necessary for the grantor or
other owner to compute their taxable income; and (3) a
statement that all items of income or gross proceeds are to
be reported by the grantor or other owner. 59 Fed. Reg.
37450 (July 22, 1994), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
RENEWAL. The plaintiff rented farm land from the
defendant under a written three-year lease. The lease also
provided that the plaintiff had “an option to purchase” the
rented property during the lease period. At the end of the
three years, the parties continued the arrangement by oral
leases. The landlord offered to sell the property to the tenant
but the tenant refused because of the high price asked. The
tenant brought suit to enforce the lease purchase option
when the landlord sold the land to a third party for less than
the landlord asked from the tenant. The tenant argued that
the oral extensions also extended the right to purchase the
land, citing Mont. Code § 70-26-204. The court held that the
written lease provided the tenant with a right of first refusal
to purchase the land; however, that right was not extended
by the oral leases because the written lease contained no
enforceable provision for extension of the right. The court
also held that the statute provided for an oral extension of a
written contract provision for only one year after the
termination of the written contract. Wilson v. Terry, 874
P.2d 1234 (Mont. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The plaintiff had boarded horses with
a stable and failed to pay the boarding fees. The stable filed
a lien for the fees and eventually placed the horses for sale
at a UCC “foreclosure” sale. The plaintiff sued the stable
and horse buyer for conversion, claiming that the stable had
no right or authority to sell the horses and that the buyer
took possession of the horses knowing that the stable had no
right to sell the horses. The plaintiff did not tender the fees
due before the sale. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendants. The appellate court reversed,
holding that because the stable failed to show that it had
complied with the foreclosure statute, Or. Rev. Stat. §
87.152 et seq., an issue of fact remained as to whether the
stable had sufficient title to sell to the buyer. Cottle v.
Hayes, 875 P.2d 493 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK. The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture,
Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP) issued
regulations, Wis. Admin. Code § Ag 80, issued in
compliance with the federal Food and Drug Administration
regulations governing grading of milk. The Wisconsin
regulations provided that if an inspection of a dairy farm
found a violation of the milk safety regulations, the farmer
would receive a notice of the violation and a request to
correct the violation. If a second inspection found the same
violation, the farmer’s Grade A permit would be
immediately suspended until the violation was corrected.
The farmer had the right to a hearing on the first inspection
within 20 days after the inspection and the same right after
the second inspection. The plaintiff challenged the
Wisconsin regulations as violating the plaintiff’s due
process rights in allowing the Grade A permit to be
suspended without a prior hearing. The court held that the
regulations do not deprive the plaintiff of due process
because the plaintiff had a right to a hearing on the first
inspection which occurred before the suspension  and the
suspension occurred only after a finding that the violation
still existed upon a second inspection. Smith v. Wisconsin
DATCP, 23 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994).
PESTICIDES. The petitioners were a licensed pesticide
operator and an employee. The petitioners applied various
pesticides to agricultural land near residences and a school
and the Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA)
discovered pesticides on those properties after complaints
were filed. The ODA charged the petitioners with violations
of Or. Rev. Stat. § 634.372(2) for improper application of
pesticides contrary to the pesticide label, resulting in the
contact with other persons or property. The petitioners
objected to the violations because (1) the labeling
requirement impermissibly gave pesticide manufacturers the
ability to determine what was a legal application of the
pesticide; (2) the pesticides were not shown to have come in
contact with any person; (3) the ODA applied the incorrect
standard of negligent misapplication where the statute
required intentional misapplication; and (4) the evidence did
not show how the pesticides got on to the other properties.
The court held that (1) the labeling requirements were
established through federal and state agency regulations and
were not within the discretion of the manufacturers; (2) the
statute did not require actual contact of persons with the
pesticide, only exposure; (3) the statute required only
intentional application which did not comply with the
labels, not intentional misapplication; and (4) the evidence
was sufficient to show that the pesticide drifted on to the
adjacent properties since the petitioners failed to provide
any evidence of other methods. Henderson v. Dept. of
Agriculture, 875 P.2d 487 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
